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On Multilateral Hierarchical Dynamic Decisions
Krzysztof Szajowski
Abstract Many decision problems in economics, information technology and in-
dustry can be transformed to an optimal stopping of adapted random vectors with
some utility function over the set of Markov times with respect to filtration build by
the decision maker’s knowledge. The optimal stopping problem formulation is to
find a stopping time which maximizes the expected value of the accepted (stopped)
random vector’s utility.
There are natural extensions of optimal stopping problem to stopping games-
the problem of stopping random vectors by two or more decision makers. Various
approaches dependent on the information scheme and the aims of the agents in a
considered model. This report unifies a group of non-cooperative stopping game
models with forced cooperation by the role of the agents, their aims and aspirations
(v. Assaf and Samuel-Cahn(1998), Szajowski and Yasuda(1997)) or extensions of
the strategy sets (v. Ramsey and Szajowski(2008)).
Key words: nonzero-sum games; stopping time; stopping games; Bayesian games;
voting games; players’ priority.
1 Introduction
The subject of the analysis is the problem of making collective decisions by the
team of agents in which the position (significance) of the members is not equal.
An object that is subject to management generates a signal that changes over time.
Agents deal with capturing signals. Everyone can capture and save one of them,
and its value is relative, determined by the function that takes into account the re-
sults of all decisions. Both the ability to observe signals and their capture deter-
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mines the rank of agents who compete in this process. It is also possible that un-
equalizes of the decision makers is a consequence of social agreement or policy (v.
Feng and Xiao(2000)).
Earlier studies of such issues (cf. Ferenstein(1992), Szajowski(1993), Ramsey and Cierpiał(2009),
Dorobantu et al.(2009), Krasnosielska-Kobos and Ferenstein(2013), Ferguson(2016))
showed their complexity, and detailed models of the analyzed cases a way to over-
come difficulties in modeling and setting goals with the help of created models. The
basic difficulty, except for cases when the decision is made by one agent, consists
in determining the goals of the team, which can not always be determined so that
the task can be reduced to the optimization of the objective function as the result
of scalarisation. Most often, individual agents are to achieve an individual goal, but
without the destabilization of the team. When modeling such a case, one should
remember about establishing the rational goal of the agents in connection with the
existence of the team (v. Diecidue and van de Ven(2008)). In the considerations of
this study, we use methods of game theory with a finite number of players. However,
the classic model of the antagonistic game is not the best example of progress. The
team has interactions of agents resulting even from the hierarchy of access to infor-
mation and the order in which decisions are made. The proposed overcoming of this
difficulty consists in the appropriate construction of strategy sets and the payment
function of players so that, taking into account the interactions, construct a multi-
player game in which players have sets of acceptable strategies chosen regardless of
the decisions of other players. Due to the sequential nature of the decision-making
process, this player’s decision-making independence is at the time of making it, but
it is conditioned by the team’s existing decision-making process.
Due to the fact that the goal of each agent, aspiration assessment by defining a
withdrawal function, is to accept the most important signal from its point of view,
the result of modeling is the task of repeatedly stopping the sequence of random
vectors. In fact rating aspirations by defining the functions of payment is the one
of the preliminary work on the mathematical modeling of management problem.
Taking this into account, it should be mentioned here that this task was first put
forward by Haggstrom(1967), although Dynkin’s(1969) considerations can also be
included in this category. Despite the undoubtedly interesting implications of such
a model in applications, the subject has not been explored too much in its most
general formulation, at least it has not been referred to. We will try to point out
considerations that support such implicit modeling1.
In the game models applied to business decisions there are important mod-
els formulated and investigated by economist von Stackelberg(1934)2. Formula-
tion of the game related to the secretary problem by Fushimi [14] with restricted
set of strategies, namely threshold stopping times, opened research on the stop-
ping games with leader by Szajowski (see papers Ravindran and Szajowski(1992),
Szajowski(1992)). Similar games are subject of the research by Enns and Ferenstein(1987),
1 The stopping games as the sepcial case of the stochastic game has been presented by
Jas´kiewicz and Nowak(2016)
2 This is his habilitation (see also the dissertation [43]), translated recently to English and published
by Springer von Stackelberg(2011) (v. [9] for the review of the edition).
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Radzik and Szajowski(1988). The extension of idea of Stackelberg was assumption
that the lider is not fixed but the priority to the player is assigned randomly. Such
version of the stopping game is investigated in Szajowski(1993) Szajowski(1993)
and Szajowski(1995). The Nash equilibria are obtained in the set of randomized
strategies (cf. Neumann et al.(2002), Neumann et al.(1994)).
Two or multi-person process stoppages, originally formulated by Dynkin(1969)3,
met with more interest and research on multi-player games with stopping moments
as players’ strategies are quite well described in the literature. Both for random
sequences and for certain classes of processes with continuous time. We will use
this achievement in our deliberations.
In the following chapters, 2-4, we will discuss hierarchical diagrams in multi-
person decision problems and their reduction to an antagonistic game. We will use
the lattice properties of the stopping moments and we will obtain an equilibrium
point in the problems under consideration based on the fixed point theorem for the
game on the complete grating.
2 Decision makers’ hierarchy in multi-choice problem
Let us consider N agents multiple-choice decision model on observation of stochas-
tic sequence. The decision makers (DMs) are trying to choose the most profitable
state based on sequential observation. In the case when more than one player would
like to accept the state there are priority system which choose the beneficiary and
the other players have right to observe further states of the process trying to get their
winning state.
The aims of the agents are defined by the pay-offs function of the them. The
rationality is subject of arbitrary decision when the mathematical model is formu-
lated and should emphasize the requirement of the agents. One of the popular way
is transformation of such multilateral problem to a non-zero-sum game. When there
are two DMs it could be also zero-sum stopping game.
2.1 Zero-sum Dynkin’s Game
The originally Dynkin(1969) has formulated the following optimization problem.
Two players observe a realization of two real-valued processes (Xn) and (Rn).
Player 1 can stop whenever Xn ≥ 0, and player 2 can stop whenever Xn < 0. At the
first stage τ in which one of the players stops, player 2 pays player 1 the amount Rτ
and the process terminates. If no player ever stops, player 2 does not pay anything.
A strategy of player 1 is a stopping time τ that satisfies {τ = n} ⊂ {Xn ≥ 0} for
every n≥ 0. A strategy σ of player 2 is defined analogously. The termination stage
3 See also models created by McKean, Jr., H. P.(1965), Kifer(1969).
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is simply ν =min{τ,σ}. For a given pair (τ,σ) of strategies, denote by K(τ,σ) =
EI{ν<∞}Rν the expected payoff to player 1.
Dynkin(1969) proved that if supn≥0 |Rn| ∈ L1 then this problem has a value v i.e.
v= sup
τ
inf
σ
K(τ,σ) = inf
σ
sup
τ
K(τ,σ)
2.2 Non-zero sum stopping game
Basement process under which the game is formulated can be defined as follows. Let
(Xn,Fn,Px)
T
n=0 be a homogeneous Markov process defined on a probability space
(Ω ,F ,P)with state space (e,B). At each moment n= 1,2, ...,T , T ∈ N˜=N∪{∞},
the decision makers (henceforth called players) are able to observe the consecutive
states of Markov process sequentially. There are N players. Each player has his own
utility function gi : e
N →ℜ, i= 1,2, . . . ,N, dependent on his own and others choices
of state the Markov process. At moment n each decides separately whether to accept
or reject the realization xn of Xn. We assume the functions gi are measurable and
bounded.
• Let T i be the set of pure strategies for ith player, the stopping times with respect
to the filtration (F in)
T
n=1, i = 1,2, . . . ,N. Each player has his own sequence of
σ -fields (F in)
T
n=1 (the available information).
• The randomize extension of Ti can be constructed as follows (see Yasuda(1985),
Shmaya and Solan(2004)). Let (Ain)
T
n=1, i= 1,2, . . . ,N, be i.i.d.r.v. from the uni-
form distribution on [0,1] and independent of theMarkov process (Xn,Fn,Px)
T
n=0.
Let H in be the σ -field generated by F
i
n and {(A
i
s)
n
s=1}. A randomized Markov
time τ(pi) for strategy pi = (pin) ∈ P
T,i ∈ MTi of the ith player is τ(p
i) =
inf{T ≥ n≥ 1 : Ain ≤ p
i
n}.Clearly, if each pin is either zero or one, then the strategy is pure and τ(p
i) is in
fact an {F in}- Markov time. In particular an {F
i
n}- Markov time τi corresponds to
the strategy pi = (pin) with p
i
n = I{τi=n}, where IA is the indicator function for the
set A.
Two concepts are take into account in this investigation. It can be compared
with real investments and investment on the financial market. In real investment
the choice of state is not reversible and sharable. In the financial market the choice
of state by many players can be split of profit to all of them according some rules.
Here, it is separately considered models of payoffs definition.
The payoff functions should be adequate to the information which players have
and their decision. The player who do not use his information should be penalize.
• Let the players choose the strategies τi ∈ T
i, i = 1,2, . . . ,N. The payoff of the
ith player is Gi(τ1,τ2, . . . ,τN) = gi(Xτ1 ,Xτ2 , . . . ,XτN ).
• If the ith player control the ith component of the process, than the function
Gi(i1, i2, . . . , in) = hi(Xi1 ,Xi2 , . . . ,Xin) forms the random field. Such structure of
payoffs has been considered by Mamer(1987). Under additional assumptions
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concerning monotonicity of incremental benefits of players Mamer has proved
the existence of Nash equilibrium for two player non-zero sum game.
• Let Gn = σ(F
1
n ∪F
2
n ∪ . . .∪F
N
n ) and T be the set of stopping with respect to
(Gn)
T
n=1. For a given choice of strategies by players the effective stopping time
ν =ψ(τ1,τ2, . . . ,τN) andGi(τ1,τ2, . . . ,τN) = gi(Xν). In somemodels the process
Xn can be multidimensional and the payoff of ith player is the ith component of
the vector Xn.
Definition 1 (Nash equilibrium). The strategies τ⋆1 ,τ
⋆
2 , . . . ,τ
⋆
N are equilibrium in
stopping game if for every player i
ExGi(τ
⋆
1 ,τ
⋆
2 , . . . ,τ
⋆
N)≥ ExGi(τ
⋆
1 ,τ
⋆
2 , . . . ,τi, . . . ,τ
⋆
N). (1)
2.3 Rights assignment models
However, there are different systems of rights to collect information about under-
lined process and priority in acceptance the states of the process. The various struc-
tures of decision process can have influence the knowledge of the players about the
process which determine the pay-offs of the players. It is assumed that the priority
decide about the investigation of the process and decision of the state acceptance.
The details of the model, which should be precise are listed here.
1. The priority of the players can be defined before the game (in deterministic or
random way) or it is dynamically managed in the play.
2. The priority of the players is decided after the collection of knowledge about the
item by all players.
3. The random assignment of the rights can run before observation of each item and
the accepted observation is not known to players with lowest priority. It makes
that after the first acceptance some players are better informed than the others.
a. The information about accepted state is known to all players.
b. The information is hidden to the players who do not accepted the item.
The topics which are analyzed could be pointed out as follows:
1. Dynkin’s game;
2. The fix and dynamic priority of the players: deterministic and random;
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3 The fix and dynamic priority of the players.
3.1 Deterministic priority
3.1.1 Static.
Among various methods of privilages for the players one of the simples is permuta-
tion of players’ indices (rang). Let us propose a model of assignments the priority
(rang) to the players as follows. In non-zero two person Dynkin’s game the role
of an arbiter was given to the random process Xn. The simplest model can assume
that the players are ordered before the play to avoid the conflict in assignment of
presented sequentially states. At each moment the successive state of the process
is presented to the players, they decide to stop and accept the state or continue ob-
servation. The state is given to the players with highest rang (we adopt here the
convention that the player with rang 1 has the highest priority). In this case each
stopping decision reduce the number of players in a game. It leads to recursive al-
gorithm of construction the game value and in a consequence to determining the
equilibrium (see Nowak and Szajowski(1998), Sakaguchi(1995) for review of such
models investigation).
The players decision and their priorities define an effective stopping time for
player i in the following way.
• Let P= {1,2, . . . ,N} be the set of players and pi a permutation of P. It determines
the priority pi(i) of player i.
The considered model can be extended to fix deterministic priority. The effective
stopping time for player i in this case one can get as follows.
• Let (pin)
T
n=1 be the pure stopping strategy. If it is randomized stopping time we
can find pure stopping time with respect to an extended filtration. The effective
stopping strategy of the player i is following:
τi((p)) = inf{k≥ 1 : p
i
k
N
∏
j=1
(1− p jk)I{ j:pi( j)<pi(i)} = 1}, (2)
where p = (p1, p2, . . . , pN) and each pi = (pin)
T
n=1 is adapted to the filtration
(F in)
T
n=1. The effective stopping time of the player i is the stopping time with
respect to the filtration F˜ in = σ{F
i
n,{(p
j
k)
n
k=1,{ j:pi( j)<pi(i)}}}.
• The above construction of effective stopping time assures that each player will
stop at different moment. It translates the problem of fixed priority optimiza-
tion problem to the ordinary stopping game with payoffs Gi(τ1,τ2, . . . ,τN) =
gi(Xτ1 ,Xτ2 , . . . ,XτN ).
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3.1.2 Dynamic
In this case the effective stopping time for player i is obtained from parameters of
the model similarly.
• Let (pin)
T
n=1 be the pure stopping strategy. If it is randomized stopping time we
can find pure stopping time with respect to an extended filtration. The effective
stopping strategy of the player i is following:
τi(p) = inf{k≥ 1 : p
i
k
N
∏
j=1
(1− p
j
k)I{ j:pik( j)<pik(i)} = 1}, (3)
where p = (p1, p2, . . . , pN) and each pi = (pin)
T
n=1 is adapted to the filtration
(F in)
T
n=1. The effective stopping time of the player i is the stopping time with
respect to the filtration F˜ in = σ{F
i
n,{(p
j
k)
n
k=1,{ j:pik( j)<pik(i)}
}}.
• The above construction of effective stopping time assures that each player will
stop at different moment. It translates the problem of fixed priority optimiza-
tion problem to the ordinary stopping game with payoffs Gi(τ1,τ2, . . . ,τN) =
gi(Xτ1 ,Xτ2 , . . . ,XτN ).
3.2 The random priority of the players
3.2.1 Static(fixed) and dynamic
The random permutation of the players’ can be model of the random fix priority
when before the play the assignment of priority is based on the random permutation.
The fixed permutation is valid for one turn of the game. The effective stopping time
for player i has the following construction in this case.
• It is still fixed permutation of the player but its choice is random. The drawing of
the permutation Π is done onces for each play. Let (pin)
T
n=1 be the pure stopping
strategy. If it is randomized stopping time we can find pure stopping time with
respect to an extended filtration. The effective stopping strategy of the player i is
following:
τi(p) = inf{k ≥ 1 : p
i
k
N
∏
j=1
(1− p
j
k)I{ j:Π( j)<Π(i)} = 1}, (4)
with rest of denotations the same as in the previous section, i.e. where p =
(p1, p2, . . . , pN) and each pi = (pin)
T
n=1 is adapted to the filtration (F
i
n)
T
n=1. The
effective stopping time of the player i is the stopping time with respect to the
filtration F˜ in = σ{F
i
n,Π ,{(p
j
k)
n
k=1,{ j:Π( j)<Π(i)}}}.
• The above construction of effective stopping time assures that each player will
stop at different moment. It translates the problem of fixed priority optimiza-
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tion problem to the ordinary stopping game with payoffs Gi(τ1,τ2, . . . ,τN) =
gi(Xτ1 ,Xτ2 , . . . ,XτN ).
When the priority is changing at each step of the game we have the dynamic random
priority. The question is if the moment of the assignments, before the arrival of the
observation and its presentation to the players of after, has a role. The effective stop-
ping time for player i proposed here assume that the priority is determined before
arrival of the observation, and the observation is presented according this order.
• If the priority is dynamic and random it is defined by the sequence Π = (Πk)
T
k=1.
The effective stopping strategy of the player i is following in this case:
τi(p,Π) = inf{k≥ 1 : p
i
k
N
∏
j=1
(1− p
j
k)I{ j:Πk( j)<Πk(i)} = 1}, (5)
It is the stopping time w.r.t. F˜ in = σ{F
i
n,Πk,{(p
j
k)
n
k=1,{ j:Πk( j)<Πk(i)}
}}.
• Each player stops at different moment. It translates the problem of fixed priority
optimization problem to the ordinary stopping game with payoffs
Gi(τ1(p,Π),τ2(p,Π), . . . ,τN(p,Π)) = gi(Xτ1(p,Π),Xτ2(p,Π), . . . ,XτN(p,Π)).
3.3 Restricted observations of lower priority players.
3.3.1 Who has accepted the observation?
In a sequential decision process taken by the players the consecutive acceptance
decision are effectively done by some players. For every stopping time τ i(p,Π) the
representation by the adapted random sequence (δ ik)
T
k=1, i= 1,2, . . . ,N, is given. Let
us denote γk = inf{1 ≤ i ≤ N : δ
i
k = 1} the player who accepted the observation at
moment k if any. Similar index can be defined for the fix deterministic and random
priority as for dynamic, deterministic priority as well.
3.3.2 Restricted knowledge.
In the class of such games the natural question which appears is the accessibility
of the information. It could be that the accepted observation by the high rang play-
ers are hidden for the lower rang players when has been accepted. However, some
information are acquired taking into account the players’ behavior.
• As the result of the decision process players collect information about the states
of the process and some of them accept some states. In considered models it was
assumed that players are equally informed about the process. Further it will be
admitted that the player has access to information according the priority assigned
to him. States accepted by others are not fully accessible to the players which
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have not seen it before. However, some conjectures are still available assuming
rational behavior of the players and it is given by the function ϕ iγk(Xk) for the
player i when its priority is lower than player’s γkth.
• Effective information available for the player i at moment k can be presented as
follows.
X˜ ik = XkI{i:i≤γk}+ϕ
i
γk
(Xk)I{i:i>γk}.
• The player investigation and interaction with other players gives him filtration
F¯ in = σ{F˜
i
n,ϕ
i
γk
(Xk)}.
• Each player stops at different moment. It translates the problem of random pri-
ority optimization problem, with restricted access to observation, to the ordinary
stopping game with payoffs
Gi(τ1(p,Π),τ2(p,Π), . . . ,τN(p,Π)) = gi(X˜
i
τ1(p,Π)
, X˜ iτ2(p,Π)
, . . . , X˜ iτN(p,Π)).
Let us analyzewho has accepted the observation? In a sequential decision process
taken by the players the consecutive acceptance decision are effectively done by
some players. For every stopping time τ i(p,Π) the representation by the adapted
random sequence (δ ik)
T
k=1, i = 1,2, . . . ,N, is given. Let us denote γk = inf{1 ≤ i ≤
N : δ ik = 1} the player who accepted the observation at moment k if any. Similar
index can be defined for the fix deterministic and random priority as for dynamic,
deterministic priority as well.
4 Monotone stopping games with priority
4.1 General assumption.
Boundedness assumptions–maximal payoff.
E( sup
1≤ ji≤T
i=1,...,N
Gk( j1, j2, . . . , jN))< ∞ (6)
∀ 1≤ ji≤T
j 6=i
E( inf
1≤n≤T
Gk( j1, . . . , ji−1,n, ji+1, . . . , jN))>−∞ (7)
where k= 1,2, . . . ,N.
In order to assure that each player has a best response to any strategy chosen by
other players it is required:
∀ τ j∈T j
j 6=i
E[sup
n
Gi(τ1, . . . ,τi−1,n,τi+1, . . . ,N)|F
i
n]
+ ≤ ∞ (8)
∀ τ j∈T j
j 6=i
limsup
n→T
E
[
Gi(τ1, . . . ,τi−1,n,τi+1, . . . ,N)|F
i
n
]
(9)
≤ E(Gi(τ1, . . . ,τi−1,T,τi+1, . . . ,N)|F
i
T ) a.e..
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For further analyses the conditional expectation of the payoffs for player i should
be determine. The sequence ηn = E(Gi(τ1, . . . ,τi−1,n,τi+1, . . . ,τN)|Fn) is the con-
ditional expected return to player i if he decide to stop after his nth observation and
other players uses the stopping rules of their choice. The sequence ηn is F
i
n adapted
and under the boundedness assumption presented above the exists an optimal stop-
ping rule for this sequences for i= 1,2, . . . ,N.
Definition 2 (Regular stopping time). The stopping time τi ∈ T
i is regular with
respect to τ1 ∈ T
1, . . . ,τi−1 ∈ T
i−1,τi+1 ∈T
i+1, . . . ,τN ∈ T
N if
E(ητi |F
i
n)≥ E(ηn|F
i
n) on {ω : τi > n} for all n. (10)
Let
−→
τ−i = (τ1, . . . ,τi−1,τi+1, . . . ,τn).
Maximal regular best response will be considered. By the results of [22] and [19]
it can be established:
Lemma 1. Under (6)-(9) each player has a unique, maximal regular best response
τˆi(
−→
τ−i) to any vector of stopping times
−→
τ−i chosen by his opponents.
This does not immediately imply the Nash equilibrium existence.
4.2 Monotone structure of best responses.
The incremental benefit to player should be analyzed. It is assumed that increments
of payoffs have the following properties. Let us consider the following increments
of payoffs.
∀ m<T
1≤k≤T
∆ im(k,
−→
j−i) = Gi( j1, . . . , ji−1,m+ k, ji+1, . . . , jN)
−Gi( j1, . . . , ji−1,m, ji+1, . . . , jN)
ND Let us assume that ∆ im(k, j−i) is nondecreasing in
−→
j−i;
NI Let us assume that ∆ im(k, j−i) is nonincreasing in
−→
j−i;
Lemma 2. If (6)-(9) and condition ND are fulfilled and σ ∈ T i is regular with
respect of
−→
τ−i1 ∈ T
−i then it is also regular with respect to any
−→
τ−i2 ∈ T
−i such
that
−→
τ−i1 
−→
τ−i2 a.e.. (Under NI
−→
τ−i2 
−→
τ−i1 a.e.)
Lemma 3. Let
−→
τ−ik ∈ T
−i, k = 1,2, such that −→τ−i1 
−→
τ−i2 a.e. and ND is fulfilled
then the best response σˆ(−→τ−i1) (ˆσ)(
−→
τ−i2) a.e.. (Under NI σˆ(
−→
τ−i1) σˆ(
−→
τ−i2) a.e..)
4.2.1 Tarski’s fixed point theorem.
The fixed point theorem which will be helpful for proving the existence of the equi-
librium is obtained for the complete lattices and an isotone functions. We consider
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the partial order of random variables: τ  σ iff τ ≤ σ a.e.. The operations of supre-
mum of random variables and infimum of random variables are inner operations in
T i. If the essential supremum is considered we have also for every subset A ⊂S
that ∨A ∈S and ∧A ∈S .
Lemma 4 (Stopping set is a complete lattice). The partially ordered sets T i with
order  and operations essential supremum ∨ and essential infimum ∧ defined in it
are complete lattices.
Definition 3 (Isotone function). Let S be lattice. f is isotone function from S
into S if for τ,σ ∈S such that τ  σ implies f (τ) ≤ f (σ).
Theorem 1 ([40]). If S is a complete lattice and if f is an isotone function from S
into S , then f has a fixed point.
4.3 Main result.
Monotonicity of increments with integrability of payoff functions guarantee exis-
tence of Nash equilibrium in stopping game with various models of priority (rule of
assignments) based on the theorem.
Theorem 2 ([22]). Suppose that assumptions (6)-(9) with ND or NI holds. Then
there is a Nash equilibrium pair of stopping times. There is an vector of stopping
times τ⋆ which forms an equilibrium such that τ⋆i = σˆ(
−→
τ⋆−i), i= 1,2, . . . ,N.
5 Conclusion.
Based on the consideration of the paper we know that the various priority approach
model in the multiple choice problem can be transformed to the multiperson antag-
onistic game with the equilibrium point as the rational treatment. The equilibrium
point in all these problems exist. The construction of them need individual tretment
and it is not solved in general yet.
The presented decision model can be found with a slightly different interpreta-
tion, namely games with the arbitration procedure. Details can be found e.g. in the
works of Sakaguchi(1984) and Mazalov et al.(2002).4
The close to the models are some multivariate stopping problem with coop-
eration. In cooperative stopping games the players have to use the decision sug-
gested by coordinator of the decision process (cf. Assaf and Samuel-Cahn(1998),
Glickman(2004).
4 See also Brams and Merrill, III(1992) and Chatterjee(1981) for details concerning arbitration
procedure.
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In Kurano et al.(1980) the idea of voting stopping rules has been proposed. The
game defined on the sequence of iid random vectors has been defined with the con-
cept of the Nash equilibrium as the solution. There are generalization of the re-
sults obtained by Szajowski and Yasuda(1997). Conditions for a unique equilibrium
among stationary threshold strategies in such games are given by Ferguson(2005).
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